

AN EVALUATION OF CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES OF MULTI-AGENCY APPROACH IN COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN BONI, KENYA

Authors: Isaiah Gechuki Ong'esa¹ and Cliff Ooga Obwogi²

^{1&2}National Defence University-Kenya
P.O. Box 24381-00502, Karen, Nairobi, Kenya
Email: isaiahon@hotmail.com

Abstract

Kenya as a country has benefited from the multi-agency approach strategy to security operations promulgated in 2013 and formalized in 2015. This approach is anchored on a close collaboration of State and Non-State actors as a holistic approach towards the delivery of Government services. This paper delved into the approach as implemented in the pacification of Boni area in Lamu County. The approach was introduced to foster a close working relationship among Government security agencies and Community-Based Organisations through sharing of intelligence, conduct of patrols and surveillance to protect the locals from attacks and therefore secure national strategic interests. The researcher used the descriptive survey research design. This design was relevant in evaluating the successes and challenges of a multi-agency approach in combating violent extremism in Boni. This paper relies on both primary and secondary data. The target population included: the youth, religious leaders, Chiefs/sub-chiefs, KDF/Police officers and officers from the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the National Counterterrorism Centre in Lamu County. Cochran's formula for sample size determination was used to calculate the sample size of 115 respondents. Purposive sampling was used to identify key informants for interviews. Quantitative data was processed using SPSS while Qualitative data was analysed using content analysis. The findings from this study are that 90% of the respondents expressed confidence that the multi-agency team will succeed in ridding Boni of VE. Generally, there is an observed decline in VE activities in Boni since the security agencies adopted the multi-agency approach to operations.

Keywords: Youth recruitment, De-radicalization programs, Counter-extremism strategies, Security challenges, Inter-agency collaboration, Terrorist networks, Community resilience, Extremist indoctrination

INTRODUCTION

Global peace and stability are significantly affected by conflicts staged by terrorists, insurgents and militia groups in various parts of the world. At dawn of 21st century, the world was ushered into expansive counter terrorism strategies, policies and laws to defeat terror threats. The journey to implement counter terrorism strategies globally by the United States of America (USA) began on 7th October 2001 when 'Operation Enduring Freedom' was launched. Counter Terrorism Strategies to fight global terrorism as an aftermath of 11th September terrorist attack on the World Trade Center set pace to counter contemporary security threats (Martin, 2021). End of cold war/collapse of the Soviet bloc, led to complete shift of military strategy in warfare. Technological

advancement and diffusion of information globally led to emergency of new terror threats posing security challenges in 21st century (Mulu, 2016). The weaker uses unorthodox means to engage the mighty causing devastating impact on security. According to Barry, (2003). In his analysis 'the future of terrorism' the Taliban, ISIS, Al-Qaida and other militant groups are likely to continue with their political agenda based on self-determination/ideology. Military strategists are focused on emerging security threats and their counter measures to address global peace and stability. Influencers of global violent extremism trend is based on technology, presence of insurgency, militia groups, extremism, minority group grievances & political exclusion and governments oppressions. Taliban in Afghanistan, for last two decades employed 'hybrid tactics' which is the combination of traditional and conventional tactics to engage Afghan National Guard. Violent extremism trend by Taliban propagated for violent extremist and terrorist tactics that focused on territorial gains which resulted to US withdraw from Afghanistan in August 2021. Violent extremism is a global menace that affects peace and stability in many parts of the world (Coats, 2017).

Africa as a continent has witnessed numerous terror attacks. Most of these attacks do not abide to Laws of Armed Conflict (LoAC) and are as a result of internal conflict, cross border skirmishes, political instability and spreads to many parts of the continent in an attempt to advance their agenda (Okumu & Botha, 2007). Insecurity in Africa has continued to affect people's fundamental human rights both directly and indirectly and contributing to high numbers of people being forcibly displaced from their homes. Boko Haram terrorist group has spread from Nigeria to Chad, Cameroon and Niger. Despite perceived decline in terror threats in most parts of Africa, it has become more spread in others regions. Seventy percent of the countries with the largest increase in terrorism are in sub-Saharan Africa (Chome, 2016). Nigeria approach to counter terror acts falls under the five strategies i.e. forestall, secure, identify, prepare and implement (Ugwueze & Onuoha, 2020). These counter terrorism strategies aim at preventing terror acts, de-violent extremism, protection of citizens and key installations, early detection and defeat of terrorist attacks. Nigeria's legal effort to fight terrorism through amended Terrorism Prevention Act 2013, anti-money laundering laws and counter terrorism effort has been dismal. Despite Nigeria multi-joint task force effort, forceful recruitment, abduction and taking to hostage of school going children have been reported. Terror activities are rampant, majorly instigated by Boko Haram. The youth in Nigeria are the most vulnerable to violent extremism.

Kenya's counter-terrorism strategies focus on four pillars i.e. prevent, disrupt, protect and defeat terrorists' network (Otieno, 2019). These pillars encompass all aspects of counter terrorism to ensure best response to heightened terror attacks in Kenya based on soft and hard approaches. Despite the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) implementation of aforementioned strategies failed to prevent 'Dusit' attack and alleged Al-shabaab attacks on North Eastern/Coastal region targeting motorists and non-Muslims. Boni is still considered a 'hot bed' for instability as a result of violent extremism and terror plots despite the implementation of national counter-terrorism strategies. On 14 December 2016, the government of Kenya endorsed National Counter Terrorism Strategies and adopted multi agency approach to counter terrorism and violent

extremism in the country. According to Council & General (2014). Kenya's counter terrorism strategies are to prevent, disrupt, protect and defeat all acts of terrorism. These encompasses all aspects of multi-agency measures to ensure best response to heightened terror attacks in Kenya based on soft and hard approaches. Hard approach entails physical engagements to deter, nullify or cripple terrorism and counter violent extremism. The use of military or security force to combat terrorists which is old approach to tackling terror threats whose effectiveness in the contemporary world is rapidly waning (Ramdeen, 2017).

Security situation remains complex and unpredictable in Boni, since terrorists have capabilities to crisscross the region and establish operative cells, conduct profiling, target analysis and conduct attacks in the county. The danger is further aggravated by simultaneous terrorist attacks and 'contagious effect' across the world. The biggest security threat, is the increased number of terror activities and youth violent extremism (Okumu & Botha, 2007). The peace enjoyed by citizens in the county through combating radicals by state agencies may be perceived to be negative peace (Grewal, 2003). This creates a gap leaving the public guessing on the consequences of implementing multi-agency approach. Involvement of media coverage on military operation is important to keep the public informed and to rally national support (Obwogi, 2015).

The enticements of youth to join violent extremism to fight in 'holy war' and trick of hefty rewards for the religious fighters and extreme indoctrinations done through 'Madrasa' is of great concern. Conversion of non-Muslims into the Islamic religion to advance violent extremism especially targeting the youth. Masjid Musa and Shakinah Mosque were accused by security forces for being radical centres and storing weapons and explosives in November 2014. Boni attracts more Muslim extremists because the city is largely Muslim. Terror operatives find it easier to recruit and radicalise the youth. The terrorists also find it easier to conceal/camouflage and rally supporters who are largely Muslim population (Botha, 2014). The cases of violent extremism are on the rise as evidenced from current security situation in Boni. Economic growth and development have been slowed down due to the effect of terrorism on tourism industry. On 8th January 2020, Al-Shabaab released a public statement 'Kenya Must Take Heed'; this indicates likely terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab in the country (Obwogi, 2021).

Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group based in Somalia, has remained active in the region, launching sporadic attacks across neighboring areas. Boni Forest in Lamu County, which is close to the Somali border, serves as a safe haven for Al-Shabaab militants to recruit and train terror operatives. The porous border between Somalia and Kenya is accessible through cut-lines, such as the 'Bima-Katar cutline,' which militants frequently use (Chepkenen, 2020). Al-Shabaab relies on indoctrination through violent extremist ideology to lure youth into joining terror networks. Lamu County's accessibility via land, air, and sea has facilitated the recruitment of local youth from Boni into Al-Qaeda-linked terror groups. This situation prompted the researcher to identify gaps in current counterterrorism strategies, particularly regarding de-violent extremism interventions. While the National Counter Terrorism Centre has strengthened government efforts to combat terrorism (Mogire & Agade, 2011), concerns remain over the effectiveness of de-radicalization

programs and the disengagement of predisposed individuals. A key gap identified is the need to analyze the consequences and implications of the multi-agency approach in Boni. Similar institutions in other countries have been established to combat violent extremism, yet the persistence of threats highlights the necessity to investigate the level of resilience and ongoing challenges in countering violent extremism in Boni.

METHODOLOGY

The researcher used the descriptive survey research design. This design was relevant in evaluating the successes and challenges of multi-agency approach in combating violent extremism in Boni. With the utilization of descriptive survey research design, the researcher utilized surveys. A mix-method approach was adopted. The mix-method approach utilized semi-structured questionnaires and interview guides. Questionnaires were administered to the 115 respondents. Interviews were done to 11 Key Informants. Qualitative and quantitative approaches allowed leveraging the abilities of one approach to cover up limitations of the other, therefore improving the quality of results (Cresswell and Clark, 2011).

The target population for this study included adult population of 58% of entire population estimated to be 143,920 (Statistics, K. N. B. O. 2019). The study targeted the youth, religious leaders, Chiefs/sub-chiefs, KDF/Police officers and officers from the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the National Counter Terrorism Centre in Lamu County. The target population is well versed with issues surrounding violent extremism in Boni as well as multi-agency approach to counter security threats. The youth formed a key constituent of the target population since they have been adversely mentioned as the most common target group involved in violent extremism.

The study used purposive sampling technique to obtain samples from the target population. Purposive sampling used to select specific individuals to provide information on account that they are experts, have firsthand experience or have in depth knowledge about the subject under study. In this study, the researcher used purposive sampling to obtain samples from religious leaders, government administration officers, police officers and officers from the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the National Counter Terrorism Centre in Lamu County. Additionally, purposive sampling was used to obtain samples from the population of youths. This was done so as to only collect data from youths who had been radicalized and had been rescued and rehabilitated.

The study used a sample size of 115 participants. The sample size was arrived at using Cochran's formula on sample size determination:

$$n = \frac{z^2 p (1 - p)}{d^2}$$

Where,

n - Minimum sample size.

Z - is the table value for standard normal deviate corresponding to 95% significance level (= 1.96).

p – the proportion in the target population estimated to have characteristics being measured (7%)

d – margin error, set at ± 0.05

$$n = \frac{1.96^2 \times 0.07 \times 0.93}{0.05^2}$$

$$= 100$$

100+ 15 allowance for non-response = 115 participants

Table 1: Sample frame

Category of population	Frequency	Percentage
Youths	70	61%
Government administration officers	10	9%
Religious leaders	5	3%
Police officers	10	9%
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit officers	10	9%
National Counter Terrorism Centre officers	10	9%
Total	115	100%

Source: Researcher 2025

Two main data collection tools utilized were: questionnaires and key informant interviews. This means that the study used a mix of quantitative data and qualitative data. Key informant interviews yielded qualitative data while most parts of questionnaires yielded quantitative data.

RESULTS

The study sought to examine the demographic characteristics of the respondents. The characteristics examined included age, gender, level of education, and religion. Understanding these attributes provides context for interpreting the responses gathered from participants involved in the multi-agency operations in Boni Forest, Lamu County. In terms of age, 72% of the participants were between 36 and 50 years.

With respect to gender, 90% of the respondents were male, while 10% were female. Considering the level of education, 92% of the respondents had attained university-level education. As for religion, 90% of the respondents were Christians, while 10% were Muslims.

Challenges and Successes of Multi-Agency Approach in Combating Violent Extremism

Understanding on Violent Extremism

The study sought to establish respondents' understanding of the term *violent extremism* (VE). Interviews were administered to the participants to obtain their views on what they understood by the phrase. The responses revealed varied perceptions among the respondents.

Most of the respondents indicated that violent extremism involves the use of violence to achieve certain political, ideological, or religious objectives. Others described it as an ideology driven by extreme beliefs and fundamentalism, where individuals are radicalized to support violent actions. Respondent KSI0001 defined Violent Extremism as beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals. He further gave terrorism and other forms of politically motivated and communal violence as examples of violent extremism.

Upon beefing up on the understanding of violent extremism, Respondent KSI0002 explained that: "This is when social ideologies such as religion are exploited for very skewed interpretations and employed to cause terror, subversion, or coups." The respondent elaborated that individuals or groups often take advantage of religious or social belief systems to advance distorted messages that justify violence and intolerance. According to the respondent, such manipulations are intended to mislead followers, create divisions within communities, and incite hostility against those perceived to hold opposing views. The emphasis was that these actions are deliberately orchestrated to destabilize social order, undermine legitimate authority, and promote extremist agendas under the guise of defending faith or ideology.

In addition, Respondent KSI0003 defined violent extremists as a group that uses threats, death, and destruction to cause superfluous fear amongst the population to drive an agenda, seek attention, and discredit a government. The respondent further elaborated that such groups intentionally employ intimidation, targeted killings, and large-scale destruction of property as tools to instill widespread fear and uncertainty within society. The acts are often well-coordinated and symbolic, designed to attract media attention and project an image of power and control. According to the respondent, the fear generated by these actions forces citizens to lose confidence in state institutions and question the government's capacity to maintain peace and security. The respondent added that the deliberate targeting of civilians, government facilities, and public spaces serves not only to advance the group's political or ideological objectives but also to create divisions among the population, disrupt normal social functioning, and exert psychological pressure on both the public and state authorities.

Challenges facing Multi-agency Approach

The study sought to establish the challenges facing the multi-agency approach to security operations, particularly in the Boni area. Interviews were conducted with officers and other respondents involved in the operations. The findings revealed several challenges that affect the effectiveness of the multi-agency framework.

Most respondents identified limited resources, competition among security agencies, uncooperative members of the population, insufficient and inaccurate intelligence, unwillingness to share information, and mistrust among agencies as the predominant challenges.

Respondent KSI0004 mentioned *resources, interoperability challenges, legitimacy, and corruption* as the main obstacles encountered during joint operations.

Respondent KSI0005 reported *competition amongst security agencies* as a recurring problem, noting that this competition weakens coordination and mutual support during operations.

Respondent KSI0006 cited *the uncooperative part of the population* as another challenge, explaining that local communities are sometimes unwilling to collaborate with security personnel in intelligence sharing.

Respondent KSI0007 identified *differences in techniques, tactics, and procedures* as a key barrier to coordination among agencies involved in multi-agency operations.

Respondent KSI00010 pointed out *corruption and poor utilization of allocated resources* as another limitation, indicating that mismanagement of available funds and materials affects the overall performance of joint operations.

Respondent KSI00011 added *lack of infrastructure* as a significant challenge, stating that poor road networks, unreliable communication systems, and inadequate social amenities such as hospitals and schools make it difficult to sustain operations in the Boni area.

The key challenges of multi-agency collaboration were broadly categorized as inefficient communication across agencies, difficulties in establishing and maintaining shared situational awareness, and lack of adequate organizational understanding.

Successes and Effectiveness of Multi-agency Approach

Effectiveness of the Multi-Agency Approach

This subsection highlights the effectiveness of Multi-agency Approach distribution of the respondents.

There has been remarkable effectiveness of multi-agency approach on prevention of Violent Extremism in Boni.
50 responses




Figure 1: Effectiveness of Multi-agency Approach

From the quantitative data (Figure 1), half (58%) of respondents agreed that the multi-agency approach has been remarkably effective in preventing violent extremism in Boni, while 34% strongly agreed. These findings are supported by respondents' qualitative accounts. For instance, Respondent KSI0004 reported that calm has been restored in Boni, violent extremism activities have reduced, security has improved, and schools have resumed operations. Similarly, Respondent KSI0001 highlighted that the opening of main supply routes, reduction in contraband goods, foiling of planned attacks by Al-Shabaab, and active community involvement in intelligence sharing reflect the operational effectiveness of multi-agency collaboration.

Multi-agency Approach Operational Success

This subsection highlights the Operational Success distribution of the respondents.

The Multi-agency approach will eventually lead to operational success aimed at routing out Violent Extremism in Boni.

50 responses




Figure 2: Multi-agency Operational Success

Regarding operational success (Figure 2), 50% of respondents agreed that the multi-agency approach is key to solving future security challenges in Boni, and 46% strongly agreed. These quantitative results are reinforced by qualitative narratives. Respondent KSI0008 stated that the approach has denied freedom of action to extremist elements, facilitated economic activities in a safer environment, and reduced radicalization. Respondents emphasized that coordinated operations, proper resource utilization, and community engagement have contributed significantly to these successes.

Multi-agency Approach has led to Improved Security

This subsection highlights the improved security distribution of the respondents.

The multiagency approach has led to improved security in Boni

50 responses




Figure 3: Multi-agency has led to Improved Security

The data on improved security (Figure 3) indicate that 46% of respondents strongly agreed and 44% agreed that multi-agency operations have led to better security in Boni, with only 6%

disagreeing. Qualitative evidence supports these figures. Respondent KSI0004 noted the return of displaced residents to their homes, while schools that had previously closed due to insecurity have reopened. Respondent KSI0001 added that increased security has also enabled safer economic and social activities, showing a direct link between operational coordination and improved security outcomes.

Multi-agency Approach Security Agencies working together

This subsection highlights the improved security agencies working relations distribution of the respondents.




Figure 4: Security Agencies working together

Figure 4 shows that 52% of respondents agreed that security agencies work together effectively in multi-agency operations. Thirty-two percent did not comment, while 8% considered the working relationship to be strained. The qualitative accounts align with these findings, as respondents described instances of joint planning, shared intelligence, and coordinated field actions, which have contributed to operational efficiency.

Multi-agency Approach has succeeded in routing out VE

This subsection highlights the success of Multi-agency Approach towards routing out VE in Boni forest distribution of the respondents.




Figure 5: Multi-agency has succeeded in routing out VE

Quantitative findings (Figure 5) show that 90% of respondents expressed confidence that the multi-agency approach will succeed in ridding Boni of violent extremism. These perceptions are supported by qualitative narratives, with respondents reporting concrete outcomes such as the reduction of terrorist activities, improved community trust, and foiling of extremist attacks. Respondent KSI0001 specifically mentioned the effective flow of intelligence and proper resource utilization, while Respondent KSI0008 highlighted the disruption of extremist networks and reduced radicalization as key successes.

DISCUSSION

The findings show that respondents conceptualize violent extremism (VE) primarily as the use of violence to advance political, ideological, or religious ends. Many respondents described it as an ideology driven by extreme beliefs and fundamentalism, with radicalization of individuals into violent actions. This aligns with Kenya's national framework, which recognizes that VE is a multi-agency challenge requiring integrated responses (Government of Kenya, 2023). Moreover, scholarly work indicates that extremist groups often manipulate socio-religious ideologies and narratives of marginalization to recruit and justify violence (Neumann, 2013; Morema, 2020). The local stakeholders in your study demonstrate awareness of both the behavioral (violence, destruction) and ideological (radicalization, exploitation of beliefs) dimensions of VE, which is important because interventions must address not only acts of violence but also the belief systems and social dynamics that enable them.

Additionally, respondents emphasized that VE manifests through creating fear, undermining state authority, and mobilizing radicalized populations to destabilize communities. This perception reflects broader research showing that effective counter-VE strategies must recognize how extremist actors aim to delegitimize government and manipulate community discontent (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2016). Their articulation that VE is not merely isolated acts of terror but part of a broader strategy to achieve ideological goals aligns

with contemporary frameworks classifying VE on a continuum of ideologies and violence (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], 2020). The respondents' clarity on these elements provides a solid basis for designing prevention and intervention programs tailored to the Kenya/Coast region context.

The findings of this study reveal several challenges facing multi-agency operations in Boni. Respondents highlighted limited resources, uncooperative segments of the population, competition and mistrust among security agencies, lack of infrastructure, and difficulties in sharing accurate and actionable intelligence. These challenges align with previous research on multi-agency coordination in complex security environments. For instance, Boin, McConnell, and 't Hart (2010) argue that coordination failures, competition for resources, and lack of trust among collaborating agencies can undermine operational efficiency and reduce the overall effectiveness of crisis response initiatives. Similarly, in the Kenyan context, Njiru and Muna (2023) note that multi-agency operations often face structural and operational constraints, including inter-agency rivalry, gaps in communication systems, and insufficient logistical support, all of which limit the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to threats.

Infrastructure deficits, such as poor road networks, limited communication channels, and inadequate social services, were also reported by respondents as contributing to operational challenges. These deficits make it difficult for agencies to maintain a continuous presence and engage with communities effectively, which can impede intelligence collection and rapid response. Additionally, community cooperation emerged as a critical factor; mistrust between security actors and local populations can limit access to vital information and reduce the legitimacy of interventions (UNDP, 2016). The findings suggest that while the multi-agency approach has demonstrated successes, these operational, structural, and socio-cultural challenges must be addressed to sustain effectiveness. Literature supports this, emphasizing that building trust, improving communication infrastructure, and fostering inter-agency cohesion are essential for the long-term success of multi-agency security frameworks (OSCE, 2020; Morema, 2020).

Quantitative findings indicate strong positive perceptions of the multi-agency approach, with over half the respondents agreeing that it has been effective in Boni. These perceptions are reinforced by qualitative narratives, where respondents reported restored calm, reopening of schools, return of evacuees, improved security, and disrupted extremist actions. This corresponds with studies in Nairobi County showing that coordination structures, resource mobilization, and community engagement within a multi-agency framework positively influence operational effectiveness (Njiru & Muna, 2023). Furthermore, Kenya's national counter-terrorism architecture emphasizes a multi-agency, whole-of-society approach to counter VE, which likely underpins the positive perceptions reported by respondents (Government of Kenya, 2023).

The qualitative data further highlight specific mechanisms through which the multi-agency approach delivers results, such as improved intelligence sharing, community involvement, opening supply routes, reducing contraband flow, and denying extremists freedom of action.

These mechanisms mirror findings from other contexts showing that multi-agency cooperation enhances operational agility, resource sharing, holistic planning, and quicker response times (Njiru & Muna, 2023; Morema, 2020). The fact that local respondents link improved security and social infrastructure (e.g., schools reopening, population returns) to joint agency operations underscores that such collaboration has both tactical and socio-community benefits.

The respondents' strong consensus regarding the effectiveness of multi-agency operations suggests that these interventions should be institutionalized, sustained, and enhanced. Practically, this entails formalized coordination structures, clear roles and protocols, shared intelligence systems, joint training, and community-led interventions (UNDP, 2016; OSCE, 2020). Moreover, the observed improvements in calm, security, and socio-economic activity indicate that practitioners should build on these gains by scaling community involvement, integrating social services with security operations, and establishing feedback loops linking community perceptions to operational planning.

From a policy perspective, Kenya's National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) already acknowledges multi-agency collaboration as a critical strength for preventing VE by engaging government agencies, civil society, religious leaders, and communities (Government of Kenya, 2023). The local findings from Boni provide empirical support that this approach yields tangible benefits. Policymakers should therefore ensure adequate funding, address institutional competition and mistrust, and embed monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that track both quantitative metrics (incident rates, arrests, return of displaced persons) and qualitative outcomes (community trust, school reopening, population return) (Njiru & Muna, 2023; Morema, 2020).

While respondents perceive significant success, caution is warranted because perceptions may not always translate into long-term outcomes. The study relies on subjective accounts, which may be influenced by optimism or social desirability bias. Additionally, empirical evaluation of multi-agency interventions using robust metrics remains limited in both Kenya and other regions. Future research should link these positive perceptions with objective indicators, such as extremist incident rates before and after interventions, youth radicalization levels, community cooperation metrics, and intelligence sharing effectiveness. Evaluating how multi-agency approaches adapt to evolving extremist tactics, including online radicalization, is also critical. Integrating these dimensions would help refine the multi-agency model and ensure it remains responsive to shifting threat landscapes.

CONCLUSION

There has been a notable decline in violent extremism activities in Boni following the adoption of the multi-agency approach by security agencies; the strategy has yielded both successes and challenges in its implementation. Key achievements include improved intelligence sharing and joint operations that have led to the arrest and neutralization of extremist threats, development of critical infrastructure such as roads and communication networks that enhance both security and

local livelihoods, and community outreach initiatives that foster trust and counter radicalization. However, the approach faces persistent challenges including inter-agency rivalry and lack of unified command, limited community trust due to past human rights violations and inadequate local participation, resource constraints affecting personnel, logistics, and funding, and an overreliance on reactive rather than preventive measures that fail to address root causes such as poverty, marginalization, and ideological indoctrination.

To enhance the effectiveness of combating violent extremism in Boni, it is recommended to strengthen inter-agency coordination by establishing a centralized command structure with clear roles, accountability mechanisms, and joint training programs to promote cohesion and shared operational culture; enhance community engagement through community policing models that empower residents and by investing in civic education and counter-narrative campaigns to reduce vulnerability to extremist ideologies; improve resource allocation by ensuring adequate funding, logistical support, and modern surveillance and communication technologies for efficient operations; institutionalize preventive measures by integrating socioeconomic development initiatives such as education, employment, and health services into security planning and by collaborating with civil society and religious leaders to counter ideological motivations; and monitor and evaluate continuously through robust frameworks that assess impact, enable adaptive strategies, and promote data-driven decision-making in response to evolving threats.

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