

Arguing for the Possibility of African Philosophical Agency: A Response to Hegelian Contempt

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Abstract

Any expectation of Africans' active participation in philosophical learning, teaching and research is strongly opposed to Hegel's understanding of Africans. The German philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is namely the architect of what I call the Hegelian contempt. That refers to the Eurocentric denial of Africans' ability to philosophise. Reasonably, therefore, as a response to Hegel, arguing for (rational defence of) the possibility of African philosophical agency should be integral to any rigorous attempt to advocate philosophy in Africa. This article examined a view that a reasonable advancement of the response to the Hegelian contempt should initially work towards the exposition of necessary conditions for Africans to acknowledge the unique role of philosophy in human self-realisation. Accordingly, four sections constitute the article's argumentation. The introduction is a consideration of the Hegelian contempt as a real problem. The second section discloses contempt's substance. The third section attempts to propose a desirable beginning of the advancement of the response to Hegelian contempt. Central to article's conclusion is that the future of African philosophical agency continually presupposes Africans' receptiveness to philosophy. And foundationally that is excellently achievable by identification of Africans' philosophical neediness, and advocacy of philosophical education in Africa.

Keywords: *Philosophical education, Philosophical agency, African philosophy, Introduction to philosophy*

1. Introduction

In the preface of his book *Interpreting Philosophy: The Elements of Philosophical Hermeneutics*, the American philosopher, Nicholas Rescher writes:

Metaphilosophy is philosophy's poor and neglected cousin. Philosophers are on the whole too busy doing philosophy to take time to stand back and consider reflectively how the project itself actually works. And they tend to produce texts without too much consideration of how this looks from the standpoint of the consumer (Rescher, 2007, p. vii).

Furthermore, the Kenyan philosopher, Maurice M. Makumba, declares:

The relevance of philosophy is not always obvious to everyone. The role of philosophy in the development of human civilisation in general and for the realisation of the human individual in particular has on many occasions been questioned, ridiculed and sometimes even met with outright rejection altogether (Makumba, 2005, p. 14-15).

The above statements suggest that any rigorous attempt to advocate philosophy in whichever human society should start with an enquiry into the addressees' openness to the philosophical mode of enquiry. *Mlingano Philosophical Advocacy Attempts* (MPAA) is a proposed advocacy programme which attends to the problem of addressees' receptiveness to philosophy within Tanzanian intellectual context. To be sure, the programme rests on the assumption that Africans are capable of philosophical thinking. However, that is a controversial assumption which necessarily demands the attention of the programme itself. Yes, a rational defence of the possibility of African philosophical agency must be integral to the efforts to unfold MPAA.

The history of humanity accommodates a fatal disregard of the African identity in varied aspects. The slave trade and the European colonialism in Africa are epitomes of the mega embodiment of the disrespect of Africans' social, economic, religious, political, cultural and intellectual identities. In truth, the slave trade and the European colonialism express a high degree of disrespect of Africans' human dignity. The striving for a further unfolding of MPAA occasions a look at an instance of explicit *scholarly adherence* to the disrespect of African intellectual identity. I have chosen to name that adherence *the Hegelian contempt*. Named after its founder, a German philosopher George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *the contempt* refers to the Eurocentric tradition which holds that Africans, especially the Sub-Saharan Africans, are incapable of the philosophical thinking. As a result, "until recently, in the history of philosophy and civilisation, the West regarded Africans as a people who were not capable of a philosophical mode of inquiry and (as a result) lacked civilisation" (Ochieng'-Odhiambo, 2009, p. 1)

Indeed, *the Hegelian contempt* is radically opposed to any attempt to advocate philosophy in Sub-Saharan Africa, to which Tanzania belongs. Hence, rigorous advocacy of philosophy within an African intellectual context should entail resistance to *the Hegelian contempt*. That underlines why a rational defence of (arguing for) the possibility of African philosophical agency should be integral to the endeavours to unfold MPAA. Here, it deserves note that there exist already considerable scholarly opposition to *the Hegelian contempt*. Accordingly, Placide Tempels through his book *Bantu Philosophy*, Martin Bernal through his work *Black Athena* (in four volumes), Henry Olela through his book *From Ancient Africa to Ancient Greece*, and George James through his work *Stolen Legacy* typify the available scholarly opposition to *the Hegelian contempt*.

Therefore, *Arguing for the possibility of African philosophical agency: a response to Hegelian contempt* is an effort to show how functional is MPAA to the rational defence of the African philosophical agency. Precisely, this article aims to underscore the exposition of *philosophical neediness* and *philosophical education* in MPAA's inaugural study, namely, *Constructing a foundational introduction to philosophy: an investigation into elements*, as constituting a good beginning of the efforts to advance the resistance to *the Hegelian contempt*.

Structurally, four main sections constitute this article. So, three sections follow this introduction as the first section. The exposition of the thoughts which define the nucleus of

the Hegelian contempt is the second section. The third section attempts to show how best one can inaugurate the advancement of the response to such contempt. The last section is the conclusion. That is an emphasis on the necessary conditions for the rewarding future of African philosophical agency.

2. The Hegelian Contempt

A German philosopher and theologian Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born on August 27, 1770, in Stuttgart, Germany. At the University of Tübingen, Germany he studied philosophy, and then theology. His career as University professor began at the University of Jena, Germany, in 1801. Hegel died on November 14, 1831, in Berlin, Germany.

The Philosophy of History is one among the Hegel's works. That work, as Hegel puts it, is the thoughtful consideration of history (Hegel, 2001). Therein he enquires into whether history is merely the recording of past events which happen by chance or is there principle which underlies those events. For Hegel, there is the force behind events and activities, namely *reason*. He writes: "The only Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of History, is the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process" (Hegel, 2001, p. 22). Hegel (2001) understands reason as being both the substance and form of every aspect of human life, be it natural or spiritual. Hence, *the being* and *subsistence* of the Universe presuppose in every way the presence of reason.

It is in *The Philosophy of History*, published posthumously; where Hegel expresses the denial of the possibility of African philosophical agency. Specifically, he (2001) expresses the rejection of the possibility of philosophical thinking in sub-Saharan Africa; the African region which he calls Africa proper, to distinguish it from what he calls European Africa, namely, the north of the Sahara, and Asiatic Africa, referring to the river region of the Nile. For him (2001), Africa proper is as completely different from European Africa and Asiatic Africa as it is from the rest of the world. In his view, the defining feature of Africa proper is that it has no reason, and consequently, it has no history, development, and culture. He remarks: "The peculiarly African character is difficult to comprehend, for the very reason that about it, we must quite give up the principle which naturally accompanies all our ideas — the category of Universality" (Hegel, 2001, p. 110). Consequently, Hegel cancels any attention to Africa proper, as far as the thoughtful consideration of global history is concerned. He declares:

[...] we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the world; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical movements in it — that is in its northern part — belong to the Asiatic or European World (Hegel, 2001, p. 110).

At this point, it should suffice to note that in the debate and the discourse on African philosophy, Hegel's views and supposition regarding Africa are considered to underlie the beginning of the formalised and institutionalised school that denies philosophy to Africa. (Ochieng'-Odhiambo, 2009). To be sure, the history of philosophy houses considerable adherence to *the Hegelian contempt*. The contempt's followers include the French philosopher Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (born April 1857, Paris – France, died March 13, 1939,

Paris). His observance of the Hegelian contempt is accommodated in his famous study of *primitive mentality*. The second adherent to *the contempt* is German missionary, Africanist and linguist Diedrich Hermann Westermann (born June 24, 1875, Baden, Achim, Germany – died May 31, 1956, Baden, Achim). In his book *The African Today*, which appeared in 1934, Westermann, like Hegel and Lévy-Bruhl, defends the view that African mentality differs significantly from European mentality. Precisely, for Westermann (1934), African mentality is, incapable of logical thinking. Apparently, for Hegel, Lévy-Bruhl and Westermann, any desire or attempt to attribute philosophical creativity to Africans is absurd. For them, Africans should be left to enjoy their swimming in the ocean of emotions, unconsciousness and contradictions.

This concept is brought out through the following: Defence of the possibility of African philosophical agency: a twofold start out, philosophical neediness and advocacy of philosophical education

2.2 Defence of the Possibility of African Philosophical Agency: A Twofold Start out

Today, the advocacy of the philosophical enterprise in Africa should entail efforts to advance the defence of the possibility of African philosophical agency. But how adequately is that accomplishable? In the foreword of Ochieng'-Odhiambo's book *African philosophy: An Introduction*, Owakah writes:

The dynamism and spirit of the moment is that African scholars and commentators on African philosophy ought to discuss issues, forget the controversies of the Eurocentric tradition and try to generate a “locus” upon which to found an African epistemology through which African realities will be interpreted. For example, what categories and concepts of operation should be used in African philosophy and what reality does it reflect? How should meaning and interpretation be harnessed within an African philosophy? (Ochieng'-Odhiambo, 2009, p. viii).

From Owakah's remarks, I can assert that for one to adequately respond to the Eurocentric denial of Africans' ability to philosophise, should strive more for conditions required for African production of philosophical deliberations than lingering on the Eurocentric arguments against Africans' ability to think philosophically. Owakah's approach is, so to say, an effect-based approach. Buying that thought or approach, I find one question worth tackling: What could be a good beginning of executing Owakah's thought?

The careful creation of philosophical deliberations presupposes the acknowledgement of the irreplaceable role of philosophy in human development and the resultant readiness to participate in philosophical undertakings. Indeed, consideration of resistance to *the Hegelian contempt* must begin with a reflection on the problem of receptiveness to philosophy. Regarding that, it deserves note that *the Hegelian contempt* is mostly founded on life facts which appear to point to *philosophical neediness* or *philosophical empty-handedness* within African human societies. To justify that, it suffices to refer readers to some information which underlies Hegel's exclusion of Africans from the agency of philosophical mode of thinking. Hegel writes:

The peculiarly African character is difficult to comprehend, for the very reason that in reference to it, we must entirely give up the principle which naturally accompanies all our ideas — the category of Universality. In Negro life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet attained to the realisation of any substantial objective existence — as for example, God, or Law — in which the interest of man's volition is involved and in which he realises his own being (Hegel, 2001, pp. 110-111).

Turning our attention in the next place to the category of *political constitution*, we shall see that the entire nature of this race is such as to preclude the existence of any such arrangement. The standpoint of humanity at this grade is mere sensuous volition with energy of will; since universal spiritual laws (for example, that of the morality of the Family) cannot be recognised here. Universality exists only as arbitrary subjective choice. The political bond can therefore not possess such a character as that free laws should unite the community (Hegel, 2001, p. 114).

Therefore, a guiding thought here is that the quickly ascertainable *symptoms or signs of philosophical neediness* in Africa, which constitute the primary basis for *the Hegelian contempt*, should continually be a *wake-up call* for the Africans and their allies to act accordingly. That brings us to what I call a *twofold effective start out of participation* in the rational defence against *the Hegelian contempt*, namely, *the striving for the acknowledgement of philosophical neediness* and *the need for advocacy of philosophical education in Africa*. Indeed, for an African production of philosophical thoughts, Africans should first be lead to understand their neediness of philosophical mode enquiry, and consequently, be habituated to philosophical thinking. A brief flicking through the inaugural contribution to the MPAA publication series should help to clarify that assertion.

2.3 Concerning Philosophical Neediness

MPAA's inaugural study (Masangu, 2020) is an attempt to uncover *elements* which should constitute a *foundational introduction to philosophy*. The work identifies four elements, namely, a foundational meaning of philosophy, addressees' outlook on philosophical thinking, perennial meaningfulness of philosophy and facts of philosophical education. Of these elements, the assertion of philosophical neediness in Tanzanian intellectual context is placed under the exposition of perennial meaningfulness of philosophy. The affirmed guiding thought there is that philosophical condition within people's intellectual context presupposes liberation from the rule of stupefying forces which include mental laziness, belief in superstition and arbitrary powers of religions, traditions and the state. On that, the degree of *philosophical neediness* corresponds to the degree of liberation. The level of liberation is at best ascertainable by a critical enquiring into rational conditions of social orders, including the religious, political and cultural settings (Masangu, 2020).

As a nutritional deficiency is recognisable at a specific symptom(s) or disease(s), so is a philosophical deficiency. Admittedly, philosophical thinking is one of the factors which define the sound health of the human being as a rational being (*Homo sapiens*). On this, Rescher writes the following:

The old saying is perfectly true: philosophy bakes no bread. But it is also no less true that man does not live by bread alone. The physical side of our nature that impels us to eat, drink, and be merry is just one of its sides. *Homo sapiens* requires nourishment for the mind as urgently as nourishment for the body. We seek knowledge not only because we wish, but because we must. For us, humans, the need for information, for knowledge to nourish the mind, is every bit as critical as the need for food to nourish the body. Cognitive vacuity or dissonance is as distressing to us as hunger and pain. We want and need our cognitive commitments to comprise an intelligible story, to give a comprehensive and coherent account of things. And this is where philosophy comes in, in its attempt to grapple with our basic cognitive concerns (Rescher, 2012, p. 18).

To be sure, there are specific symptoms and diseases at which a philosophical deficiency (neediness) is identifiable. For example, *mental laziness* could be seen as a symptom and *rule of absurdity* as a serious disease (Masangu, 2020). Concerning Tanzanian intellectual context, it must be mentioned that Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanganyika and later of Tanzania, and a devoted advocate of the rational architecture of social arrangements in Tanzania's political history, most often expressed worry about the possibility of *mental laziness* and *rule of absurdity*. For example, he once asserted:

A society like everything else, must either move or stagnate – and in stagnation lies death. A mind unused atrophies and man without mind is nothing (Nyerere, 1966, p. 120).

Nyerere's worry was not illusory. In truth, *mental laziness* is attestable in different levels of today's Tanzanian social arrangements. As a simple example, it is not rare to see Tanzanian families and other social circles surrendering uncritically to the principle that *an elder does not err* (Masangu, 2020). So, the younger one is, the lesser chance to participate in the decision-making. Moreover, as an easily attestable *rule of absurdity* in today's Tanzanian societies, one should see, for example, that even today the belief in magic powers is a vital refuge for many Tanzanians (Masangu, 2020). Undoubtedly, the *rule of absurdity* in Tanzania has fatal existential consequences. It underlies the denial of decent human existential modes powerfully (Masangu, 2020). For instance, "belief in magical powers is for some people a substitute for critical thinking, researches, results of scientific experiments and hardworking" (Masangu, 2020, p. 96). Elsewhere there is the following assertion:

Yes, one thing has to be said. The escape to the magical powers, in which man thinks to find solutions, has led even to national tragedies: the killing of older women and the people with albinism. People are said to believe that an organ of living human being with albinism brings wealth. As a result, the Tanzanian societies repeatedly witnessed the killing of fellow human beings in the name of wealth. Moreover, there are societies which believe that red-eyed older women are sorceresses, and therefore, they deserve brutal death (Masangu, 2020, p. 94).

In 1961, following the independence, Tanganyika waged war against three great enemies: ignorance, poverty and diseases. There is still a lot to be done in Tanzania against ignorance. On this, Nyerere provides noteworthy guiding thoughts. He (1966, p. 179) says: “We cannot hope to solve our problems by pretending they do not exist.” Doubtlessly, as a rewarding starting point of philosophical enterprise in Tanzania, the Tanzanians must first be led to acknowledge their philosophical neediness.

According to Nyerere (1966, p. 309), “only careful thought about our own problems and the relentless application of scientific and objective thinking can enable us to achieve the betterment of our lives to which we are committed.” And further, he (1966, p. 310) says: “Only when we are clear what we are trying to do can we begin to think about a way of doing it.” That brings us to the question of a joint agency of the advocacy of philosophy in Tanzania.

2.4 Concerning Advocacy of Philosophical Education

The assertion of *philosophical neediness* is the first important aspect of an effective start out of participation in the correction of *the Hegelian contempt*. The second essential aspect is the striving for advocacy of *philosophical education*. For sure, the reality of African philosophical creativity, for example, in Tanzanian human societies, presupposes Tanzanians’ *philosophical ascent of mind*. Hence, besides the above-given reference to the perennial meaningfulness of philosophy, as the proposed third element of *a foundational introduction to philosophy*, the look at *the programmatic habituation* to philosophy, as the fourth element, should help extend the exposition. Indisputably, a philosophical rise of a human mind is not an overnight phenomenon. The acquisition of philosophical active-mindedness is a time-taking and goal-centred process. It requires well-defined practices of human mind’s habituation to the philosophical mode of thinking (Masangu, 2020). Undoubtedly, “the systematic locating of philosophy in academic and non-academic open spaces is a desirable or even essential condition for individual and collective mind’s habituation to the philosophical mode of inquiry” (Masangu, 2020, p. 99). Consequently, the two last chapters of MPAA’s opening study, namely, chapter four and chapter five, serve as a theoretical formulation of advocacy plan for philosophical education in Tanzania.

According to Nyerere (1966, p. 187), “a nation which refuses to learn from a foreign culture is nothing but a nation of idiots and lunatics.” Accepting that thought, the facts of philosophical education across the globe deserve attention. The UNESCO’s detailed study of the year 2007, which bears the title *Philosophy, a school of freedom: Teaching philosophy and learning to philosophise: Status and prospects*, appears to be the best tool to lead people to an encounter with the global witnesses of the implementation of the locating of philosophy in academia and outside academia. Concerning the nature of the 2007 UNESCO’s study, it is remarked:

This work is not simply an inventory of what is being done and not being done in the field of teaching philosophy today. By establishing a clearly understandable interpretative framework, by offering suggestions and new orientations, it goes well beyond that. In this way, it is intended to be a genuine, practical, future-oriented tool,

well-documented and up to date, where each person will find food for thought (UNESCO, 2007, p. ix).

A good story about ‘philosophy at UNESCO’ is that philosophy has always belonged to UNESCO. Yes, philosophy “inspired its Constitution to a large extent, and as early as 1946, UNESCO bestowed upon itself a philosophy program” (UNESCO, 2007, p. xii). That story is founded on UNESCO’s acknowledgement of the irreplaceable role of philosophy in the uplifting of humanity. Here below is UNESCO’s example assertion:

What is the teaching of philosophy if not the teaching of freedom and critical reasoning? Philosophy actually implies exercising freedom in and through reflection because it is a matter of making rational judgements and not just expressing opinions, because it is a matter not just of knowing, but of understanding the meaning and the principles of knowing, because it is a matter of developing a critical mind, rampart par excellence against all forms of doctrinaire passion. These objectives require time, taking a serious look at oneself, at other cultures and languages (UNESCO, 2007, p. ix).

The 2007 UNESCO’s study shows plainly that the locating of philosophy in all levels of academia – preschool, primary school, secondary school and university – is a global reality. That is attestable by looking at what is happening in the individual U.N. Member States. In that regard, chapter four of *Constructing a foundational introduction to philosophy* is dedicated to a survey of example countries. About the implementation of *philosophy for or with children*, example U.N. Member States include France, Norway, Austria and the United States of America, to mention but a few (UNESCO, 2007). Of those countries, part of the Austrian testimony reads as follows:

P4C [Philosophy for Children], as an educational project, began in Austria in 1981. In 1982, the Council of Philosophy Teachers became involved and made the national educational authorities aware of the possibilities of introducing P4C programmes in schools. The first lessons were given in schools in 1983, which were also used as teacher-training workshops [...]. In 1984, the Federal Ministry for Education, Science and Culture authorised a pilot P4C programme in schools (20 classes and 600 children). The Austrian Centre of Philosophy for Children (ACPC) was founded in 1985, to promote philosophical enquiry as an important part of the primary and secondary school curriculum by organising international conferences, teacher-training seminars and workshops (UNESCO, 2007, pp. 30-31).

As for the locating of philosophy in secondary schools, the disclosed example States include the Republic of Korea, Canada, Argentina, Morocco, France, Switzerland, Portugal, Brazil and the Dominican Republic (UNESCO, 2007). Of those, a section of the testimony from Portugal reads as follows:

The subject ‘Introduction to Philosophy’ is included in the general education group in the tenth and eleventh years of schooling, with three hours per week of classes. All Portuguese secondary students take two years of philosophy. The Education Reform,

which stipulates that ‘Introduction to Philosophy’ is the second-most important subject of the core curriculum, has given philosophy a level of dignity almost equal to that of Portuguese classes and accords irreplaceable educational and developmental power to it (UNESCO, 2007, p. 75).

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Concerning the teaching of philosophy at the university level, Canada, France, India, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Algeria are example U.N. States (UNESCO, 2007).

Besides the facts of the locating of philosophy in academia, the 2007 UNESCO unveils witnesses of the locating of philosophy outside academia. UNESCO’s study uncovers different kinds of philosophical practice in a non-academic context. Those practices include philosophy counselling, the philosophy café, philosophy workshops, publishing successes, philosophy with children outside school, philosophy at work and philosophy at difficult contexts. According to the study, the philosopher’s role in the state is manifold: Working with marginalised youth, philosophy for those in precarious situations, philosophising in prisons, philosophising with retirees, promoting philosophical activity at work, the state’s philosopher, philosophy Day(s), Internet Projects, Philosophy Olympiads, Debates following film screenings and philosophy house. As for the implementation of the locating philosophy outside academia, France, Norway, Belgium, Spain and Netherlands, to mention but a few, are example U.N. States. Of these countries, France reports on the philosophical debate in prisons and Netherlands on philosophy month and philosophy night (UNESCO, 2007).

It deserves note that the 2007 UNESCO’s study stands firmly in opposition to *the Hegelian contempt*. The study does not make any distinction between the world’s nations or regions, as regarding the possibility or ability of the philosophical agency. For UNESCO, the striving for philosophical creativity is an equally shared mission by all countries and regions of the world. In truth, if it is about the struggles for global advocacy of philosophical thinking, then what UNESCO expects, for example, from Argentina, Austria or Japan, it expects the same from Tanzania. As for that, it is asserted:

Each Member State of UNESCO, all NGOs, all philosophical associations, and all others concerned and interested are therefore asked to take up the challenge of appropriating the results of this study and of discovering constructive, useful orientations there. May, therefore, each draw upon a vast body of ideas, experiences, initiatives, and practices, brought together in an opportune manner so as better to face tomorrow’s challenges (UNESCO, 2007, p. ix).

Accordingly, the 2007 UNESCO’s study discloses the reality of the advocacy of philosophical education from the perspective of five world’s regions: (i) Latin America and Caribbean (ii) Africa (iii) Asia and the Pacific (iv) Europe and North America (v) Arab World. Contrary to *the Hegelian contempt*, for UNESCO, Africa is integral to the global philosophical agency. Of course, for UNESCO, execution’s situations or the time for the daybreak of philosophical education might differ from one country to another or from one region to another. That is

attested by a statement of the 1995 UNESCO's Paris Declaration for philosophy: "Philosophical teaching must be maintained or expanded where it exists, introduced where it does yet exist, and be explicitly called 'philosophy'" (UNESCO, 2007, p. xiii). Indeed, a self-conscious nation cannot plausibly encounter the issue of philosophical education negligently. The concern is even more pressing for nations which own a *philosophy-alien* education system, as it is the case with Tanzania (Masangu, 2020).

As regarding Tanzania's intellectual context, a pending question is about how best to lead Tanzania to philosophical education. Chapter five of *Constructing a foundational introduction to philosophy* is dedicated to the answering of that question. In the introduction of that chapter, it is asserted that "sustainable plan for philosophical education in Tanzania should spring from united mental and physical efforts" (Masangu, 2020, p. 189). Hence, that chapter is a suggestion attempt of how best to create collective advocacy of philosophical education in Tanzania. Accordingly, five educational determinants are considered to be an adequate foundation for joint advocacy, namely, the parental role, the scholarly role, the general political role, the governmental (regulatory) and the religious role. Of these roles, the scholarly role should constitute the starting point (Masangu, 2020). Beginning with the author of *Constructing a foundational introduction to philosophy* who is likewise the architect of MPAA, the scholarly role should become a reality. Precisely, the founder of MPAA is expected to be the reason for academic philosophers in Tanzania to form the first of the three components of the joint scholarly advocacy of philosophical education. Other components are non-academic philosophers and other academicians. The scholarly efforts, which include philosophical publications, provision of philosophical seminars and establishment of philosophical information centres, should be a cause of cooperation of other four named determinants (Masangu, 2020).

Moreover, it should be clear to the readers that three acts define the collective agency: the acts of edifying, regulating and promoting. Of course, the degree of an embodiment of those acts differs from one agency to another. So, while all five educational determinants should share the act of promotion equally, the act of edifying belongs chiefly to the scholarly agency and the act of regulating belongs chiefly to the governmental agency (Masangu, 2020).

Parental agency refers to prenatal care and children's custodianship. Rational thinking expresses a personal maturity's process which, according to Aristotle, goes as back as to child's time in the womb of its mother. In Aristotle's view, the planning for children's excellent citizenship begins with the care of marriage and prenatal care (Masangu, 2020). It deserves note that while the 2007 UNESCO's study starts with preschool level, Aristotle's concern embraces prenatal care. On that, he writes, for example, the following:

Women who are with a child should take care of themselves; they should take exercise and have a nourishing diet. [...] they shall take a walk daily [...]. Their minds, however, unlike their bodies, they ought to keep quiet, for offspring derive their natures from their mothers as plants do from the earth (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1335b, 13-19).

Let it here be said: “Much as the scholarly agency could work out a lot of useful scientific approaches to care of pre-wonder age and philosophy for children, any withdrawal of children’s custodians would mean an apparent setback” (Masangu, 2020, p. 199). Admittedly, “the triumph of philosophical education, especially for children, requires in every way an active involvement of children’s custodians” (Masangu, 2020, p. 199).

Concerning general political agency and governmental agency, it must be asserted that the reality of rigorous advocacy of philosophical education, requires, in the end, an adjustment or reform of the country’s or province’s education system. Yes, “the custodian of the country’s education system is namely the government: the chief regulating actor” (Masangu, 2020, p. 200). Note that the general political agency refers to all those activities executed by political organs apart from the government in power, and the governmental agency refers precisely to activities executed by the government in power. As for this, a study by UNESCO’s (2007) uncovers example testimonies, including the following: a) in 2005, the Norwegian government took the initiative of commencing formal experimentation with P4C in schools. Trial classes have been organised in fifteen primary and secondary schools, for children from six to sixteen years, and have involved forty-three teachers. (UNESCO, 2007, p. 25) b) Moral education in the Republic of Korea is governed at the national level, as a fundamental part of the country’s curriculum. It is one of the ten core subjects taught in primary and secondary schools (UNESCO, 2007, p. 56).

About religious advocacy agency, it should be said that “by its unique unifying character, religion can quickly bring many differences to unity” (Masangu, 2020, p. 200). On this, the words of John Mbiti are worth embracing:

Religion helps people to communicate in two directions. First, there is social communication. People meet together for a common purpose, for example, to pray together, to perform a ritual together, to sacrifice together, and so on. They also meet indirectly through having common myths, legends, values, traditions, morals and views of the world. Because of religion, they are able to understand one another, to communicate ideas and feelings and to act more or less as a social unit, even if there may be other differences (Mbiti, 1991, pp. 199-200).

It suffices to remark that philosophical education should one day become an apparent reality in the Tanzanian intellectual context. That cannot, however, happen arbitrarily; it requires thought-out planning for joint advocacy undertaking.

3. Conclusion

One of the rational expressions of a firm belief in the irreplaceable role of philosophy in human development is philosophical advocacy attempts. Such attempts refer simply to a striving for people’s active participation in the philosophical mode of enquiry which is excellently manifested by well-planned philosophical learning, teaching and research. Regarding that, consideration of two facts should constitute the beginning of any rigorous advocacy of philosophical thinking, namely, addressees’ ability to philosophise and their

receptiveness to philosophy. Indeed, unless the two facts are achieved, there is reasonably no philosophical creativity or agency.

So, while in striving for Africans' active partaking in philosophical thinking, one might assume the fact of their ability to philosophise, *the Hegelian contempt* articulates a radical Eurocentric denial of such ability. Hence, an explicit rational defence of (arguing for) the possibility of African philosophical agency should be integral to rigorous efforts to enforce philosophy in Africa. But how is that excellently accomplishable? As asserted above, a significant advancement of the response to Hegelian contempt seems to dwell in the creation of conditions required for African production of philosophical deliberations than lingering on the Eurocentric arguments against Africans' ability to philosophise. That is to say, what is required is the striving for the Africans' effect-based reaction to the contempt. A rising question where should that be started? That question takes us to the assertions of MPAA's inaugural study. Doubtlessly, the Africans' effect-based response presupposes Africans' receptiveness to philosophy. The very first starting point is the creation of necessary conditions for Africans' acknowledgement of the unique role of philosophy in human self-realisation. With that, it should finally be said that the future of African philosophical agency continually presupposes Africans' receptiveness to philosophy. And foundationally that is excellently achievable by *identification of Africans' philosophical neediness*, and *advocacy of philosophical education* in Africa.

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